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Transnational Society as a Mirror of International Society: 
A Reinterpretation of Contemporary World Order 
 
Abstract 
Although there has been widespread attention to the apparent rise of a transnational society of cross-border 
non-state actors alongside the international society of states, transnational society and international society 
have traditionally been treated as distinctive domains with different institutions. This article, by contrast, aims 
to transform theorization of world order through its investigation of how actors in transnational society have 
developed institutions that mirror in notable respects some of the primary institutions of the international 
society of states such as through serving constitutive and regulative functions. In addition to delineating these 
institutions of transnational society, the article interrogates the interdependence of these institutions of 
transnational society and those of international society, as well as their differences and repercussions for world 
order. The analysis considers how, in conjunction with the contribution of institutions of international society to 
international order, institutions of transnational society contribute to transnational order. By exploring not only 
the tensions between but also the complementarities of transnational and interstate institutions, the article 
both provides a reinterpretation of contemporary world order and helps reveal the potential for its more 
harmonious operation. 
 
Keywords: English School; transnational relations; non-governmental organizations; global order; world society 
 
Introduction 
One of the most commonly noted aspects of world politics in the twenty-first century is the 
role of transnational actors (TNAs), the significance of which has gained increasing recognition 
(Malet and Anderson 2017). There is also a growing body of literature on sub-categories of 
TNAs such as international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and the ways in which 
they influence intergovernmental decision-making (Ruhlman 2014; Willetts 2011). There has 
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further been widespread recognition of the long development of ‘transnational civil society’ 
(Colas 2002; Davies 2014) and of forms of ‘politics beyond the state’ (Stephen and Zürn 2014; 
Wapner 1995). At the same time, there has been revived interest in the English School 
concept of ‘world society’ (Stivachtis and McKeil 2018; Weinert 2017), including 
‘transnational society’ which according to Buzan (2004, 120) consists of the interactions 
among TNAs. 
  These various bodies of literature have made significant progress in advancing our 
understanding of aspects of transnational society such as its advocacy role in relation to states 
(Keck and Sikkink 1998; Busby 2010), its interactions with intergovernmental institutions 
(Clark 2007), and its functions in global governance (Coen and Pegram 2018; Zürn 2018). 
Buzan (2004; 2018) has highlighted how transnational society exhibits not only unique 
institutions such as advocacy but also shared institutions with international society such as 
environmental stewardship, the market, and human equality. Although there has been 
recognition of the distinctive practices of ‘politics beyond the state’ (Wapner 1995; Jie 2016), 
there remains the neglected question of how TNAs have developed institutions that enable 
transnational society to function as a society and provide order in that society, rather than 
simply enabling TNAs to influence international society (in the case of advocacy) or to 
participate in joint endeavours with states (in the case of shared institutions). In addressing 
this question, this article explores how TNAs have developed a set of previously neglected 
institutions that are in significant respects analogous to some of the primary institutions of 
international society, and argues that these institutions of transnational society promote the 
common fundamental goals of transnational society including performing constitutive and 
regulative functions.  
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 Gaining a better understanding of the institutions among TNAs is particularly pressing 
in the current context of a world order in which the certainties of a state-centric set of 
institutions are becoming less sustainable as the role of TNAs increases (Hurrell 2007; Stephen 
and Zürn 2014). Since institutions are suggested to have provided the basis of order in 
international society (Bull 2012; Friedner Parrat 2017), if TNAs share institutions analogous in 
their functioning to the institutions of the society of states, then previously neglected further 
potential for order beyond the society of states may also be revealed. Moreover, if one can 
recognize parallels between the institutions of international society and those of 
transnational society, then one’s capacity may be enhanced to understand potential bases 
for a harmonious post-state-centric world order bridging international society and 
transnational society, extending beyond familiar processes of global governance. 
 The subsequent sections of this article provide a reinterpretation of world order by 
outlining how TNAs in transnational society have developed institutions of their own which 
contribute towards transnational order in a similar manner to the contribution of institutions 
of international society to international order. In this perspective, world order constitutes the 
parallel functioning of non-state institutions of transnational order and inter-state institutions 
of international order, as well as the interactions and interdependence of these institutions. 
In developing this framework, the article commences by delineating the institutions of 
transnational society and their similarities and differences from parallel institutions in 
international society, before outlining their contributions to transnational order, and through 
their interdependent relationships with the institutions of international society, their 
contribution to world order. Acknowledgement of the tensions with international society and 
of the important role of states in facilitating transnational society is integrated in the analysis. 
 4 
Although referring to an array of contemporary and historical experience, this article 
is primarily a theoretical contribution to the study of international relations, aiming to offer a 
new framework for interpreting patterns of behaviour in contemporary world order rather 
than aiming to demonstrate universalizable causal relationships. In this manner this article 
builds on a long tradition of English School literature in its approach to understanding world 
politics (Bull 1966; Hurrell 2007; Buzan and Lawson 2016). 
 
Actors and Institutions in Transnational Society 
Following Buzan (2004, 120), transnational society is understood in this article as referring to 
TNA-TNA relations, a domain of world order distinct from the interstate domain of state-state 
relations and from the inter-human domain of relationships between individuals. Whereas 
the principal actors in international society are states, in transnational society they are TNAs. 
TNAs comprise the subcategory of non-state actors (NSAs, which may be local, national, or 
transnational) that cross national borders and operate in multiple countries (Malet and 
Anderson 2017, 4-5). Just as analyses of actors in international society concentrate on those 
actors that are considered to be legitimate members of that society – i.e. mutually recognized 
states – the TNAs in transnational society that are the principal focus of this analysis are those 
that are widely recognized as legitimate members of transnational society. Many but not all 
of these are INGOs, a sub-category of TNAs which are not only not established by 
governments, but also not-for-profit, non-criminal, and non-violent (Willetts 2011). There is 
an important distinction in transnational society between civil and uncivil actors (Kaldor 2003; 
Bob 2011), a distinction that, as will be discussed later in this article, mirrors the operation of 
standards of ‘civilization’ in international society. As the article will later elaborate, the 
establishment of standards of mutual recognition in transnational society limits the range of 
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TNAs in transnational society to those that wish to participate in such a society and are 
mutually recognized. Given this limitation, this article focuses in large part on INGOs.  
Transnational terrorist organizations are usually excluded by transnational society’s 
recognition criteria, while profit-making transnational corporations (TNCs) may participate in 
transnational society through involvement in transnational initiatives for accountability and 
social responsibility, and in transnational business associations that subscribe to the 
standards of transnational society.  
Whereas transnational society is traditionally considered in respect of ‘the political 
engagement of non-state actors with the society of states’ (Buzan 2018, 129; Busby 2010), in 
this article the focus is on the way in which TNAs have constructed their own institutions 
making possible what Wapner (1995) termed ‘politics beyond the state’, in a similar manner 
to the way in which states have developed institutions facilitating interstate politics. 
The institutions of the international society of states have been described by 
Schouenborg (2017, 2) as ‘patterned practices, ideas, and norms/rules’ serving functions such 
as legitimacy and membership criteria, and procedures facilitating conflict regulation, trade 
and governance. Institutions as understood here constitute what Keohane (1988, 385) terms 
‘fundamental practices’, distinct from particular regimes that have been ‘designed for specific 
purposes’ (Onuf 2002, 228). These institutions are thought to uphold the primary goals of 
international society (Bull 2012) and to serve both constitutive and regulative functions 
(Buzan 2004, 181). 
Fundamental – or ‘primary’ – institutions such as sovereignty, international law, and 
diplomacy have traditionally been seen to be the distinguishing features of the international 
society of states (Bull 2012; Buzan 2004; Wilson 2012). Transnational society – on the other 
hand – is thought to have developed a distinct set of practices of its own embodying ‘politics 
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beyond the state’, such as raising public awareness of issues, community empowerment 
initiatives, and consumer activism (Wapner 1995; Jie 2016). Interrogation of the primary 
institutions of transnational society, however, has remained underdeveloped, despite 
advances in understanding institutions shared by international society and transnational 
society (Buzan 2018). 
 
[Insert figure 1 approximately here.] 
 
 As depicted in figure 1, the international society of states and the transnational society 
of TNAs have traditionally been perceived to be distinctive domains with practices unique to 
their respective domains. As further depicted in figure 1, the relations between international 
society and transnational society are traditionally understood to involve both top-down 
procedures regulating TNAs provided by states in international society (Bloodgood, Tremblay-
Boire and Prakash 2014) and bottom-up advocacy practices of TNAs in transnational society 
promoting reforms in international society (Clark 2006; Busby 2010; Buzan 2018).  
 In this article, by contrast, the parallels between international society and 
transnational society are emphasized. It is argued that alongside the development of the 
institutions depicted in figure 1, transnational society has also mirrored international society 
in the development of a set of its own institutions providing criteria for mutual recognition, 
common standards, dispute resolution procedures, means of authoritative communication, 
and even hegemonic management processes. These institutions are not identical to those of 
international society, but mirror in important respects their purposes and operation. This 
revised interpretation of world order by which institutions transnational society mirror those 
of international society is depicted in figure 2. 
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[Insert figure 2 approximately here.] 
 
 In describing a range of institutions of transnational society as mirroring those of 
international society, this article is not claiming that transnational society’s institutions are 
derived from those of international society: instead it is claiming that transnational society 
has developed its own parallel set of institutions to those traditionally perceived to be unique 
to international society in providing constitutive and regulative functions for the member 
actors, in this case TNAs rather than states. However, as elaborated later in the article, the 
role of states in facilitating the development of the institutions of transnational society must 
also be acknowledged. 
 Some of the more recent additions to the recognized institutions of international 
society – such as environmental stewardship, the market, and human equality (Buzan 2004, 
Wilson 2012) – are shared by international society and transnational society. TNAs provide 
private environmental regimes such as forest sustainability certification, transnational 
frameworks facilitating global market transactions such as SWIFT, and private labour 
standards such as Fairtrade, each effectively providing a private counterpart to 
intergovernmental regulation in the institutions of environmental stewardship, the market, 
and human equality (Büthe 2010).  These shared institutions are already well-covered in 
existing literature (Buzan 2018), and operate alongside the parallel institutions considered in 
this article. 
 Unlike the shared institutions considered in other literature, the institutions of 
transnational society considered in this article are not identical to but instead are analogous 
to those of international society. The subsequent sections of this article consider in turn five 
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analogous institutions: criteria for mutual recognition and legitimacy, common standards of 
appropriate behaviour, dispute resolution procedures, authoritative communication, and 
great power management. Whereas a focus on shared institutions is helpful in drawing 
attention to the ways in which states and TNAs may co-operate on matters of common 
concern, the focus on the analogous institutions of transnational society in this article sheds 
light on the previously neglected ways in which transnational society functions as a society in 
its own right and facilitates order among its constituent actors. The interactions between the 
parallel institutions and the shared institutions are considered in the penultimate section of 
this article. 
 The institutions of international society and transnational society are contested and 
there have been put forward many more institutions than those which are evaluated in this 
article (Buzan 2018; Schouenborg 2011; Wilson 2012). It must be acknowledged that a 
number of further alleged institutions of international society – such as territoriality, war, and 
the balance of power – may not operate in transnational society in an analogous manner to 
international society. 
In exploring institutions of transnational society, this article not only differs from 
traditional English School work and its assumption that international society’s institutions are 
exclusive to states (Bull 2012), but also contrasts with more recent analyses of the institutions 
of broader ‘world society’, the distinctive institutions of which have already received 
significant treatment (Ralph 2007, Weinert 2017). It further differs from discussions of 
institutions as discussed in regime theory, which has concentrated on explaining the 
emergence of particular ‘institutions designed for specific purposes’ (Onuf 2002, 228). Rather 
than the ‘secondary’ institutions of regime theory, the ensuing sections of this article are 
dedicated to delineating the more ‘fundamental practices’ (Keohane 1988, 385) that 
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comprise the ‘primary’ institutions considered in English School literature (Buzan 2004, 165; 
Friedner Parrat 2017). Within each of the subsequent sections of this article, however, some 
examples of ‘secondary’ institutions are used in illustration of the broader ‘primary’ 
institutions in operation. 
For Bull (2012, 8, 18), the institutions of international society underpin international 
order, ‘a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of a society of states’ 
including preservation of that society, its plural membership and the ‘common goals of all 
social life’ such as promise keeping. For the transnational society of TNAs considered in this 
article, the institutions that mirror those of international society underpin ‘transnational 
order’, a pattern of activity among TNAs that sustains the perpetuation of political activity 
beyond the state, as elaborated later in this article. 
 
Recognition Criteria in Transnational Society 
Both international society and transnational society feature recognition criteria for legitimate 
membership of the society. For analysts of international society, one of the most significant 
primary institutions consists of the recognition criteria embodied in the notion of sovereignty, 
‘the constitutive principle as to who are the members of international society’ (Bull 2012, 35, 
66; Buzan 2006, 79). In its most basic form, sovereignty has been associated with exclusive 
control over territorially defined boundaries and the capacity to enter into relations with 
other states (Moore 2015, 3; Buzan 2014a, 102). These attributes are not the exclusive 
preserve of states. Some of the oldest INGOs are recognized by states as sovereign, such as 
the Sovereign Constantinian Order and the Order of St John, the sovereignty of which is 
recognized by more than 100 states (Nuttall 2016). Examples such as these, however, are the 
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exception rather than the norm, and it is not the purpose of this article to argue that TNAs 
have the same institutions as international society, but rather that they have analogous ones.  
While in international society membership criteria involve criteria for recognition as 
states, in transnational society there are criteria for recognition of TNAs. One perspective on 
this is to claim that membership criteria of transnational society are provided by international 
society, rendering transnational society subsidiary to international society. This perspective 
holds if one concentrates on criteria of membership provided in the attributes required for 
acceptance of TNAs for consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United 
Nations. As Willetts (2011, 19) argues, ECOSOC ‘will give access to the consultative 
arrangements to almost all [transnational] organizations that are non-violent, non-criminal, 
and non-commercial’. However, there are far more TNAs than are recognized in consultative 
status with ECOSOC, or which would meet the criteria for recognition, so such a 
conceptualization is somewhat limiting. 
More significantly, TNAs have developed their own criteria of mutual recognition open 
to a wider array of actors. The Union of International Associations (UIA), established in 1910 
to serve as ‘a world center’ for cross-border associations (UIA 1914), provides the most 
widely-recognized criteria for recognition as a transnational organization, including activities 
in three or more countries and internationally-oriented objectives (UIA 2017). In its annual 
Yearbook of International Organizations, widely regarded as the main reference point in the 
field (Bloodgood 2011), more than thirty thousand active transnational organizations are 
listed (UIA 2018a). The criteria are expansive, but – like sovereignty in its purportedly 
traditional conceptualization – lacking in broader normative content (albeit criteria 
developed in a ‘Western’ historical context and excluding for-profit actors). The result is that 
a vast variety of organizations are included, from the highly political such as Amnesty 
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International, to those primarily oriented to representing sectoral professional, business and 
sports interests, such as the International Federation of Library Associations, the International 
Chamber of Commerce, and the International Olympic Committee. The UIA (2018b) derives 
its legitimacy in part from international society in that it claims to have ‘a mandate from the 
United Nations to produce the Yearbook’. However, the principal basis of the UIA’s legitimacy 
stems from transnational society: it was established at a congress of the majority of the 
principal transnational associations of the time with statutes aiming towards serving the 
common interests of all transnational associations (Davies 2017, 15). 
The concept of sovereignty is widely thought to have evolved significantly, to include 
additional prerequisites of legitimate membership of international society, such as adherence 
to various normative principles such as democracy and human rights (Biersteker 2013). 
Likewise, the membership criteria of international society are thought to have evolved to 
include various alternative bases of membership such as ‘dynasticism, popular will, 
nationalism, communism, liberal democracy, “the standard of civilization”, the capacity to 
govern, “peace loving nation”, [and] human rights’ (Schouenborg 2011, 34). Within 
transnational society, the membership criteria have also arguably evolved over time, as new 
institutions such as the Accountable Now have added dimensions such as upholding certain 
accountability and transparency practices as criteria for mutual recognition, beyond the 
limited structural dimensions required for UIA recognition (Accountable Now 2016). 
Accountable Now is one of several self-regulatory initiatives in contemporary transnational 
society that aim to provide a form of peer-based legitimacy for TNAs (Thrandardottir 2017, 
21). 
A common distinction said to have been made in international society concerns the 
‘standards of civilization’ that states have been required to uphold to gain recognition as 
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members of the society of purportedly ‘civilized’ states (Gong 1984; Buzan 2014b). In 
contemporary transnational society, rather than the civilized/uncivilized distinction, there is 
a distinction between ‘civil’ and ‘uncivil’ society (Bob 2011). Standards for distinguishing ‘civil’ 
from ‘uncivil’ actors have been developed in transnational society by organizations including 
‘CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation’, which aims to act on behalf of global civil 
society and has not only put forward indicators for measuring global civil society but also has 
a membership policy requiring adherence to a set of values that distinguish its members from 
uncivil society (CIVICUS 2014, 3). This is just one example of a standard of ‘civility’ among 
TNAs, and further cases are noted in the next section of this article. It is standards such as 
these that distinguish legitimate participants in transnational society from other actors such 
as terrorist groups.  
While non-profit objectives are often included among the criteria for ‘civility’, for-
profit actors may be represented in transnational society either indirectly by transnational 
business associations recognized as INGOs such as the International Chamber of Commerce, 
or directly through participation in transnational accountability and social responsibility 
initiatives such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), which has developed common 
sustainability standards for both profit-making and non-profit making TNAs. GRI standards 
are currently adopted by thousands of TNAs worldwide, including over 90% of the leading 
TNCs, as well as numerous INGOs (GRI 2019a). The GRI sees itself as advancing a ‘global 
community that lifts humanity and enhances the resources on which all life depends,’ 
inclusive of profit-making and not only non-profit TNAs (GRI 2019a). In this manner, mutual 
recognition of legitimate ‘civil’ actors in transnational society is becoming increasingly open 
to TNCs and not merely INGOs. This has taken place in parallel with the increasing openness 
of intergovernmental institutions to enabling participation of TNCs in global policy initiatives: 
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whereas ECOSOC recognition of TNAs in consultative status was limited to INGOs, more 
recent initiatives such as the United Nations Global Compact seek TNC participation (Willetts 
2011). It should also be noted that initiatives such as GRI have been actively promoted by 
institutions of international society, with the GRI guidelines being developed in conjunction 
with intergovernmental organizations such as UNEP (Thurm 2006, 325). 
For international society, standards of civilization have served not only the aim of 
providing membership criteria but also the provision of justifications for interventionism 
beyond the society of recognized states (Buzan 2014b). In transnational society, claims to 
greater ‘civility’ have for centuries been used by TNAs (especially INGOs) to justify their role 
in undermining purportedly ‘uncivil’ practices of others as a part of their ‘civilising missions’ 
(Forclaz 2015). 
The members of transnational society are greatly more numerous and functionally 
diverse than states in international society, with some TNAs being much more vital to 
transnational society than others, with repercussions for wider institutions of transnational 
society that will be discussed subsequently. It must also be noted that the membership 
criteria and members of transnational society are contested, and they are not as universally 
recognized as those of international society. However, membership of the society of states is 
also contested: disputed members include Palestine, Taiwan, and Western Sahara, and the 
criteria of sovereignty are further contested between absolute and conditional approaches 
(Macklem 2015, 39). Widespread recognition of the membership of international society may 
be greatly more advanced than is the case with the membership of transnational society, but 
it does not follow from this that transnational society lacks membership criteria, just as 
outliers such as Palestine do not preclude acknowledgement of membership criteria in 
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international society: rather, transnational society is earlier in the path of its development 
than international society, the institutions of which have long trajectories (Holsti 2004).  
 
Common Standards and Dispute Settlement Procedures 
In addition to membership criteria such as sovereignty, discussions of institutions of 
international society place emphasis on the practice of developing common standards of 
conduct beyond criteria for mutual recognition, as found in discussions of international law 
(Bull 2012, 122-155; Holsti 2004, 143-177). On occasion, TNAs have been permitted to sign 
intergovernmental treaties on an equivalent basis as states, a privilege enjoyed for instance 
by the International Chamber of Commerce in relation to international cooperation on 
customs formalities (Charnovitz 1997, 223). However, this is the exception rather than the 
norm, and it is the development of standards within transnational society itself that is of 
interest here.  
International law among states comprises numerous dimensions, including, inter alia, 
the development of standards of conduct and principles of dispute settlement (Shaw 2014, 
1-2). Each of these dimensions are also to be found among transnational society actors, which 
have developed standards and procedures of their own in these domains, often with the 
support of states in international society.  
 Common standards of conduct among TNAs such as those of Accountable Now and 
the GRI have already been noted on account of their role in providing membership criteria for 
transnational society. In exploring self-regulatory initiatives in the humanitarian sector, 
Deloffre (2016, 724) has suggested that they not only ‘regulate the behaviour of members’ 
but also ‘constitute their social identities, interests, and practices’. Beyond such cases, the 
One World Trust has identified more than 350 self-regulatory initiatives among TNAs 
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operating in the second decade of the twenty-first century (Laybourn 2011, 2). Although self-
regulatory and comprised of TNAs, these initiatives tend to be registered as associations in 
states, and are often established in response to government accountability requirements 
(Crack 2018). 
 In international law among the society of states, the twentieth century saw 
considerable advances in jus ad bellum and the development of procedures of dispute 
resolution through, for instance, the International Court of Justice. At the same time in 
transnational society a diverse array of dispute resolution mechanisms were developed for 
reconciling differences among TNAs. A pioneer in this domain was the International Chamber 
of Commerce, which set up a Court of Arbitration in 1922: this transnational Court has settled 
vastly more disputes among TNAs than the International Court of Justice has settled among 
states (Fouchard et al. 1999, 174). By the 1990s, more than one hundred dispute resolution 
mechanisms had developed for handling conflicts among TNAs (Mattli and Dietz 2014, 1). 
Beyond the commercial sector, there are for instance in the sport sector non-governmental 
dispute resolution mechanisms such as the Court of Arbitration for Sport (McLaren 2000). The 
role of institutions of international society in the development of these institutions of 
transnational society must be acknowledged: the Statute of the Court of Arbitration for Sport, 
for instance, was developed by a committee led by a judge at the International Court of 
Justice, Kéba Mbaye (Reeb 2006). 
 A potential objection to the notion that rules operate within transnational society 
analogous to the operation of international law in international society is that the common 
standards of conduct and dispute resolution procedures of transnational society are partial 
in their operation, each covering only particular categories of TNAs. However, the same 
critique may be applied to international law, since few treaties are universal (although they 
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more commonly have widespread participation). More significantly, this critique does not 
undermine the proposition that both international society and transnational society each 
feature practices of standard-setting and dispute settlement as a significant aspect of what 
their members do.  
An alternative critique points to the existence of outlier radical actors such as 
transnational terror networks that reject the norms of transnational society. However, in 
international society there are also outlier actors - so-called ‘rogue states’ - which reject 
norms adopted amongst most other actors in international society, yet this does not 
undermine the notion that international society has shared institutions of international law. 
Just as predominantly law-abiding states in international society greatly outnumber ‘rogue 
states’, so too law-abiding TNAs greatly outnumber transnational terrorist organizations: the 
highest estimates of the number of terrorist organizations are one eighth of the number of 
pacific TNAs listed by the UIA (Jongman 2011, 348). Moreover, before the late twentieth 
century the society of states was far from universal, yet international law was acknowledged 
to operate within that society: as noted before, transnational society is less fully developed 
in the present day than international society and with a less universal set of standards 
reflecting its greater diversity. 
 According to Bull (2012, 130), states’ common standards and dispute settlement 
procedures serve a significant role in international society on account of ‘the fact that these 
rules are considered to have the status of law’. Significantly for transnational society, there is 
growing acknowledgement that the common standards of conduct and dispute resolution 
procedures among these actors also constitute ‘transnational law’ and not merely self-
regulatory initiatives (Halliday and Shaffer 2015). This is not a new notion: in his account of 
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‘transnational law’ more than sixty years ago, Jessup (1956, 4) pointed to ‘the almost infinite 
variety of the transnational situations which may arise’ and the role of ‘over 1,100’ TNAs. 
 
Authoritative Communication 
Beyond membership criteria and international law, discussions of institutions of international 
society have also paid considerable attention to diplomacy, or ‘means of authoritative 
communication’ (Buzan 2004b, 191; Schouenborg 2011, 35-40). According to Bull (2012, 158-
159), diplomacy includes formulation and communication of foreign policy, bilateral and 
multilateral relations through appointed representatives in fora including international 
conferences, and a range of ad hoc through to highly institutionalized forms of 
communication. The most recent discussions of institutions of international society have 
preferred the label ‘means of authoritative communication’ rather than diplomacy 
(Schouenborg 2011, 38). Such an approach builds on Wight’s (1977, 29-33) discussion of 
‘communication and intercourse’ among states which disaggregated roles for, inter alia, 
messengers (ranging from ad hoc heralds to resident ambassadors), conferences and 
international institutions, and a diplomatic language.  
In some cases, such as the Regional Environmental Centre for Central and Eastern 
Europe in Hungary, representatives of TNAs have received the same diplomatic privileges as 
those of states (Noortmann 2001, 72). However, what is of significance for this analysis is not 
only the extension of interstate diplomatic practices to TNAs but the observation that TNAs 
have developed diplomatic practices – or at least ‘means of authoritative communication’ – 
of their own in transnational society.  
In transnational society, highly institutionalized communication is evident in the form 
of umbrella bodies discussed earlier such as CIVICUS that aim to act on behalf of their 
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participating TNAs: these are ‘secondary’ institutions of transnational society as conceived in 
this article. In addition to shared organizations, many further forms of ‘authoritative 
communication’ are also to be found in analogous forms among transnational society actors. 
Whereas states develop foreign policies in their relations with other states, INGOs formulate 
policies in respect of their relations with other INGOs, for instance when making decisions on 
which transnational advocacy campaigns to take part in in conjunction with other INGOs, and 
when developing positions on the specific objectives to be promoted in transnational 
advocacy campaigns (Hertel 2006). It has also become increasingly common for INGOs to 
appoint ‘external relations’ departments and managers responsible for interactions with 
other INGOs, with for example Islamic Relief Worldwide (2017, 15) having made such an 
appointment as part of its strategy for building relationships with ‘NGO partners around the 
world’. 
In an analogous manner to the appointment by states of representatives for 
negotiations with other states, INGOs appoint representatives to take part in discussions with 
other INGOs at transnational conferences organized by INGOs such as the 2009 Prague 
congress on ‘Transforming the World in Crisis’ (Glopolis 2009). TNAs also appoint long-term 
representatives to negotiate with other TNAs’ representatives through for instance 
participation in transnational governance committees such as the GRI’s Global Standards 
Sustainability Board (GRI 2019b). Communicational practices among TNAs such as these 
represent a distinctive component of TNAs’ activities from their other practices serving 
functions such as advocacy and service provision, while diplomatic practices among states are 
a distinctive set of states’ activities from states’ other practices. 
There are limits to authoritative communication in transnational society. Not every 
TNA appoints representatives to every other TNA, but neither do all states appoint 
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representatives to every intergovernmental organization or to every other state. Moreover, 
the linkages among TNAs can be extensive (Schneiker 2017), and the UIA (2017) seeks to 
demonstrate the scale of these linkages in its visualizations. Nevertheless, given that there 
are vastly more recognized TNAs in transnational society than recognized states in 
international society, and since states are generally much more multi-functional in 
comparison with the specialization of interest of most TNAs, the density of interconnections 
among TNAs in transnational society tends to be clustered by issue-area, and is far less 
extensive across transnational society as a whole. 
 
Hegemony / Great Power Management 
Power among TNAs in transnational society differs significantly from power in international 
society. These actors tend not to have military capability, with terrorist actors being excluded 
by the membership criteria of transnational society, and states traditionally monopolizing 
legitimate use of violence. Instead, participants in transnational society generally rely on 
other dimensions of power, notably the persuasiveness of their ideas (Clark 2001, 11), and in 
some cases economic resources (Allan and Haddan 2017). As a result, analogies between 
power political institutions of international society such as the balance of power and practices 
of transnational society are harder to draw. Nevertheless, one may observe practices of 
hegemonic management in transnational society mirroring in certain respects hegemonic 
management in transnational society, but on the basis of the very different functioning of 
power in this domain. Whereas preponderant states may base their preponderance in large 
part on military power, in the case of TNAs it is more likely to be on the basis of financial 
resources and popular support, as is increasingly also the case with preponderant states in 
recent definitions of hegemony (Nye 2002, 16). 
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In the society of states, the United States is thought to have had a hegemonic position 
following the Second World War that enabled it to set the international agenda in the second 
half of the twentieth century (Ikenberry 2011). Similarly in transnational society certain INGOs 
may be so dominant that they effectively set the agenda for other INGOs: in the humanitarian 
sector, for instance, principles of impartiality, neutrality, and universality developed by the 
Red Cross have been widely adopted by other organizations (Veuthey 2013, 32). Whereas US 
hegemony in international society at the end of the Second World War rested on multiple 
features including military and economic preponderance in addition to the frameworks of the 
post-war settlement, the pre-eminence of the Red Cross is underpinned by a very different 
set of properties including the appeal of the principles it propounds, as well as the support of 
states signatories to the Geneva conventions.   
When there are several dominant states in international society, states in a concert 
system may collectively set and enforce norms for wider international society (Mitzen 2013). 
In transnational society, dominant TNAs may also combine in concert to set standards for 
wider adoption, as was the case with the development of Accountable Now by eleven 
dominant organizations including Amnesty International and Save the Children (Ronalds 
2010, 98). Organizations such as these are much more influential in transnational society than 
many of the other TNAs that meet the membership criteria of transnational society but which 
have not played a significant part in developing its rules.  
 For Clark (2009, 220) hegemony in international society may be understood as an 
institution of international society in that it may serve as ‘an instrumentality of international 
society’s purpose’, reflected for instance in the set of common secondary institutions that 
accompanied US hegemony following the Second World War. Similarly in transnational 
society, hegemonic TNAs may serve the wider purpose of transnational society through the 
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provision of particular frameworks for legitimate conduct such as the standards of neutrality 
and impartiality established by the Red Cross, and of accountability provided by Accountable 
Now. 
 
Contrasts between Institutions of Transnational Society and those of International Society 
While the institutions of transnational society outlined in this article mirror in important 
respects institutions of international society, it is evident that there are significant contrasts 
between them. As noted in the previous section, one of the most important distinguishing 
features relates to the role of contrasting forms of power in international society and 
transnational society, with states in international society traditionally understood to 
monopolize legitimate use of violence (Bull 2012, 178). International society thereby provides 
a context within which the institutions of transnational society tend to be limited to concern 
with legitimate non-violent behaviour, in contrast to institutions of international society that 
may involve recourse to war, for instance under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter in 
the case of dispute settlement. Whereas military, economic and social power are all 
important in the functioning of the institutions of international society, in transnational 
society the legitimate participants are generally limited to social and economic power, 
although the growing role of private military and security companies in international relations 
may be blurring this distinction (Krahmann 2008).  
 Institutions of international society including codes of conduct and dispute resolution 
procedures have often focused on limiting states’ use of violence, and have historically 
prioritized limitations to states’ external relationships rather than to their internal conduct. 
Standards of conduct and dispute mechanisms of transnational society, by contrast, have 
focused less on regulating external conduct and concentrated more on constraining TNAs’ 
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internal practices such as their reporting procedures and governance standards, and the 
resolution of commercial rather than violent disputes. Another contrast stemming from the 
same root is to be found in the role of preponderant powers in international society and 
transnational society: preponderant states may be preponderant on a largely military basis, 
whereas in transnational society a TNA’s preponderance is more likely to follow from 
economic resources, popular support, or recognized high standing among peers.  
 A further central distinguishing feature relates to the functional differences between 
states international society – which are territorial and multifunctional actors – and TNAs in 
transnational society, which are specialized and deterritorialized. In consequence, the 
membership criteria of international society and transnational society are distinct: for the 
society of states sovereignty and territoriality are crucial, whereas for transnational society 
trans-territorial attributes such as composition extending to three or more countries are 
emphasized. Moreover, the bases of legitimacy also differ: for international society these 
have included principles such as dynasticism, popular sovereignty, and national self-
determination (Schouenborg 2011, 34), while for transnational society these have included 
expertise and accountability to various stakeholders (Steffek and Hahn 2010). Whereas states 
in international society – despite enormous contrasts in their territories, wealth and 
populations – all share many common attributes in their multi-functional nature, the 
contrasts among TNAs are far greater given their functional differences: a TNC such as Nike 
and an INGO such as Amnesty International differ vastly in their functional specialisms, but 
nevertheless share common transnational structural features, participate in common 
institutions such as the accountability standards of the GRI, and share common goals of 
transnational society embodied in these institutions as elaborated in the next section. 
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 Given the contrasting functional nature of states and TNAs and the contrasting forms 
of legitimate power they wield, each of international society and transnational society feature 
further distinctive institutions beyond those elaborated in this article. Popular lists of 
institutions of international society, for instance, often include war and territoriality in 
addition to those mirrored in transnational society considered in this article (Schouenborg 
2011; Wilson 2012). Accounts of ‘politics beyond the state’ on the other hand, emphasize 
features such as public awareness raising, community empowerment, and consumer activism 
that constitute further features of transnational society beyond the institutions that mirror 
the institutions of international society (Wapner 1995; Jie 2016).  
 Contrasts between institutions of international society and institutions of 
transnational society may also be observed in relation to scale. With respect to membership 
there are, for instance, vastly more TNAs in transnational society than there are states in 
international society: the UIA (2018a) recognizes more than thirty thousand TNAs, in contrast 
to the 193 states members of the United Nations. This has repercussions for the other 
institutions of transnational society. As mentioned earlier, the number and functional 
specialism of TNAs ensures that the density of communicational links in transnational society 
is clustered around particular issue areas, and networking is far less dense across TNAs as 
whole than the density of linkages among the much smaller number of recognized states. In 
respect of dispute resolution rules, a further result is that there are many more international 
disputes subjected to private international arbitration than there are subject to public 
international arbitration (Fouchard et al. 1999, 174). Another consequence of the vast 
number of TNAs is that only a handful of these actors – such as the founders of Accountable 
Now – play a significant role in developing the standards of transnational society. Whereas all 
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states in international society are quite extensively involved in its institutions, many TNAs in 
transnational society are highly peripheral. 
 There are also significant limitations to the institutions of transnational society 
outlined in this article. As we have seen, the criteria of membership in transnational society 
are subject to dispute, and while this is a feature shared with international society where the 
criteria of sovereign status are also contested, transnational society features a far larger array 
of competing recognition criteria with greatly contrasting sets of recognized participants. In 
respect of common standards of conduct in transnational society, many of these are of recent 
post-Cold War origin in contrast to some centuries-old components of international law, 
although it should be noted that a significant proportion of international law among nations 
is also recent (Shaw 2014, 31-34), and the notion of ‘transnational law’ is far from new (Jessup 
1956). 
As for the communicational institutions of transnational society, it is comparatively 
rare to find among TNAs equivalents to the resident ambassadors of the society of states, 
although it has been noted that INGOs send delegates to transnational congresses and 
committees. A further limitation may be observed in relation to the role of hegemonic TNAs 
in transnational society: no actor in transnational society has a hegemonic status as far-
reaching as that in international society of the United States following World War 2, although 
within particular sectoral domains – as we have seen in the case of the Red Cross in the 
humanitarian sector – certain TNAs may be considered to have had hegemonic capabilities in 
the sense of possessing the capacity to set the normative agenda in the sector. The sector-
specialization of certain institutions of transnational society is therefore a significant 
distinguishing feature from international society. 
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 The institutions of transnational society are contested, with some being adopted only 
by certain TNAs, and others being interpreted very differently by different actors. Just as 
international society consists of members for which institutions such as war and 
environmental stewardship are of very contrasting importance, so too transnational society 
– which features thousands rather than hundreds of members – displays even greater 
diversity with respect to the role of each institution in relation to each actor. Given the great 
diversity of mutual recognition criteria and common standards among TNAs – such as those 
of Accountable Now and CIVICUS – actors in transnational society may participate only in a 
selection of these initiatives. The similarities between the criteria of these initiatives, 
however, is significant, thereby indicating common understandings of recognition criteria and 
behavioural standards among TNAs extending across their diverse organizational 
manifestations (Laybourn 2011, 3). 
 An important problem confronting transnational society is the existence of a 
significant array of TNAs – such as terrorist groups – that do not participate in the common 
institutions of transnational society and exclude themselves from membership. However, it 
has been noted that non-violent TNAs greatly outnumber violent actors (Jongman 2008), and 
just as in the past international society was previously limited to a small array of actors 
apparently adopting mutually recognized ‘standards of civilization’, in the present day TNAs 
sharing standards of ‘transnational civil society’ may not yet be universal, but are growing in 
number (Eberly 2008).  
 A further problem with the institutions of transnational society outlined in this article 
is that a number of them may operate in tension with those of international society, especially 
the institutions of international society which are not mirrored in transnational society. One 
of the most frequently considered distinctive institutions of international society is 
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territoriality, by which states make exclusive claims to fixed territorial boundaries (Holsti 
2004, 73). The trans-territorial nature of the recognition criteria of legitimate TNAs directly 
challenges these claims, and given that many especially authoritarian states circumscribe the 
scope for TNAs to function within their borders, the geographical reach of transnational 
society can be significantly limited, often being far more extensive in more liberal political 
contexts (Heiss and Kelley 2017). On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that further 
aspects of the mutual recognition criteria among TNAs – notably the civil-uncivil distinction 
whereby violent TNAs such as terrorist groups are excluded from recognition – involve implicit 
acceptance of the state sovereignty framework and the concentration of legitimate violence 
in the hands of states. This is one example of the ways in which the institutions of 
transnational society may help to legitimate the institutions of international society, a theme 
to which this article will return in the penultimate section. 
  
Order in Transnational Society 
Despite their limitations, the early stage of their development, and the tensions with 
institutions of international society, the institutions of transnational society, like those of 
international society, contribute in a number of respects towards the provision of order in the 
context of a world in which there is no world government. Bull (2012, 16) claimed that the 
institutions of international society facilitate international order, consisting of ‘a pattern or 
disposition of international activity that sustains those goals of a society of states that are 
elementary, primary, or universal’. In this article, it is claimed that the institutions among 
TNAs in transnational society underpin transnational order consisting of a pattern of 
behaviour among TNAs that sustains the basic, primary, or universal goals of transnational 
society, notably constituting and legitimating transnational society, serving constituents, and 
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self-preservation. Together, the institutions of international society and those of 
transnational society facilitate world order comprised of international society, transnational 
society, and their institutions and interactions as depicted in figure 3. This figure limits its 
scope to the analogous institutions, since shared institutions have already received extensive 
treatment elsewhere (Buzan 2018), and the relationship between contrasting institutions is 
considered in the previous section. 
 
[Insert figure 3 approximately here.] 
 
As Buzan (2004, 167) argued, a central purpose of the primary institutions of 
international society is to define for states what constitutes ‘legitimate activity in relation to 
one another’. The same purpose for TNAs is served by their mutual recognition criteria, 
common standards, and communicational practices in transnational society. Hegemony 
among TNAs may be legitimized through acceptance by other TNAs of a hegemonic TNA’s 
standards, as was noted with the Red Cross in the humanitarian sector. 
A second – and related – purpose that primary institutions serve for both international 
and transnational society is that they are constitutive of that society, in that they both ‘define 
the main players/pieces in the game’ and ‘define the basic rules by which the players/pieces 
relate to each other’ (Buzan 2004, 181). In transnational society, as in international society, 
these constitutive and regulative dimensions are interlinked. The criteria for mutual 
recognition among TNAs, for instance, involve upholding common standards of conduct, 
dispute resolution processes, and practices of authoritative communication. 
Just as the goal of self-preservation in international society is said to be facilitated by 
the institutions of international society (Bull 2012, 16), the institutions of transnational 
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society that mirror those of international society serve a self-preservation function for 
transnational society. In this case the threat managed is not that from its potential 
replacement by universal empire: that objective is achieved by the institutions of 
international society. Instead, the institutions of transnational society help protect the 
members of that society from the challenges posed by changing circumstances, by other 
TNAs, and by states in international society. In the case of the criteria for mutual recognition, 
common standards, and communicational practices of TNAs in transnational society, these 
provide a self-organized framework for mutual interaction that helps enable TNAs to operate 
(at least in part) independently of the society of states, with these institutions providing a 
form of mutually recognized legitimacy in the absence of intergovernmental provisions 
(Thrandardottir and Keating 2018). Accountability standards such as Accountable Now and 
the Global Reporting Initiative serve the further function of potentially avoiding through self-
regulation more intrusive regulation from governments with the potential to threaten their 
independent functioning (Lloyd 2005, 6). It may even be argued that just as states use pooled 
security arrangements to prevent the domination of any one of them, TNAs have developed 
arrangements for common responsibilities in transnational society that help to perpetuate 
the independent action of participating TNAs and prevent any one of them from monopolizing 
resources: a prominent example in the humanitarian sector is the Disasters Emergency 
Committee by which UK-based aid TNAs work together to distribute funds across their 
members rather than acting competitively (Jones 2015).  
A fourth purpose served by the institutions of both international and transnational 
society is serving the constituencies of the members of these societies: the populations of 
states in international society and the sectors of society that TNAs claim to represent in 
transnational society. For Bull (2012, 18), the institutions of international society serve to 
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sustain what he termed ‘the common goals of all social life’ such as ‘limitation of violence 
resulting in death or bodily harm, the keeping of promises and the stabilization of possession 
by rules of property’. In transnational society, some of those ‘common goals of all social life’ 
are in part provided for TNAs by states in international society, in particular limitation of 
violence and stabilization of possession. Nevertheless, the institutions of transnational 
society also contribute to each of these purposes. With respect to the limitation of violence, 
for instance, the non-violent criteria for mutual recognition as transnational ‘civil’ actors not 
only help legitimate TNAs that meet these standards but also help delegitimate TNAs that fail 
to meet them, helping create a ‘non-violent, stable and predictable’ context for transnational 
activity (Anheier 2008, 32). Moreover, through common non-violent dispute resolution 
procedures and the provision of wide ranging non-state standards, TNAs in transnational 
society have provided alternative channels to the use of violence for resolution of their 
differences and pursuit of their goals. Through their non-violent approach to promotion of 
their aims, they are further considered to have helped with the advancement of the world 
political arena as one in which pursuit of ends through military capability is considered 
increasingly obsolete (Kaldor 2003; Nye 2010), although the growing role of private military 
and security companies in international relations limits this assumption. It is also worth noting 
that TNAs in transnational society may contribute towards limitation of violence in the 
interstate domain through social welfare activities that may address some of the deep causes 
of violent conflict, as well as through delegitimating states’ use of violence via promotion of, 
for instance, disarmament conventions and pacific settlement institutions (Cortright 2008). 
International society and transnational society share a concern to contain terrorist 
TNAs, but the mechanisms to address them through the institutions of international society 
and transnational society differ. In international society, the use of force may be justified, for 
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instance with reference to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter in response to the 9/11 
terrorist attack (Murphy 2002). In transnational society, on the other hand, legitimate 
mechanisms are generally limited to the wielding of normative power (for instance, through 
educational programmes, and exclusion of terrorist TNAs from recognition) and economic 
power (for instance, through co-ordinated action to curtail financial flows to terrorist TNAs). 
In some cases, such as public-private partnerships aimed at inter-faith dialogue including the 
Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation, non-violent approaches may be shared 
between international society and transnational society (Pace 2005). 
The institutions of transnational society established among TNAs have also 
contributed towards stabilization of possession. Dispute resolution procedures such as 
private international commercial arbitration help to provide reassurance with respect to the 
property rights across national borders of TNAs: for example, a range of private international 
arbitration procedures including those of the International Chamber of Commerce, the 
Singapore International Arbitration Centre and the London Court of International Arbitration 
are of use in resolving disputes over intellectual property rights (Politano 2012, 209-218). 
International standardization bodies have also provided TNAs reassurance with respect to 
intellectual property rights beyond national boundaries through designing standards that 
take these rights into consideration (Torti 2016, 59-60).  
Just as institutions of international society – especially international law – have helped 
to facilitate mutual promise keeping among states, so too the private standards of 
transnational society have provided reassurance among TNAs with respect to shared 
expectations of appropriate behaviour among TNAs through the so-called ‘shadow of the 
future’ that such arrangements are thought to offer. In the environmental sector, for 
instance, Prakash and Potoski (2006, 45-46) have shown the role of transnational private 
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initiatives such as green clubs in ‘creating a long shadow of the future’ through inducing 
participants ‘to incur private costs to produce non-excludable environmental benefits’. 
The goals of transnational society extend significantly beyond those shared with 
international society outlined by Bull. A typology of further aims of transnational society, for 
example, may be inferred from Wapner’s (1995) discussion of ‘world civic politics’. These 
include: (i) raising public awareness of issues; (ii) consumer activism; and (iii) community 
empowerment through direct assistance to local communities (Wapner 1995, 322, 326, 331; 
Jie 2016). Each of these aims of TNAs in transnational society is facilitated by institutions of 
transnational society outlined in this article. The raising of public awareness of issues, for 
instance, is facilitated by the various communicational procedures among TNAs that have 
been developed through which they share information with one another, ranging from highly 
organized channels of communication such as CIVICUS through discussion fora such as the 
World Social Forum to looser transnational advocacy networks by which information is shared 
horizontally among TNAs (Khagram Riker and Sikkink 2002, 6-10).  
TNAs’ communicational institutions also contribute towards the objective of 
consumer activism through, for instance, enabling dissemination of information influencing 
consumers’ choices (Armbruster-Sandoval 2005). Common standards in transnational society 
also facilitate consumer activism: the GRI, for instance, provides ‘standardized reports and 
practices’ for holding INGOs and TNCs to account (Baer 2013, 31). 
The objective of community empowerment is also facilitated by institutions of 
transnational society. The various standards of good practice established among 
humanitarian TNAs, for instance, provide a set of criteria with a view to ensuring that the aid 
and community empowerment projects that they undertake are more effective in achieving 
their objectives (Deloffre 2016). More broadly, the mutual recognition criteria among TNAs 
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help to make possible each of the activities that TNAs aim to undertake through provision of 
a form of mutually recognized legitimacy as appropriate actors in their respective fields, as 
was introduced earlier in the article.  
Not all of the institutions of transnational society outlined in this article contribute 
equally towards each of the goals of transnational society. Common standards and dispute 
resolution procedures, for instance, may have played a greater role in promoting goals such 
as limitation of violence and stabilization of possession (Torti 2016). However, a similar 
variance may be found among institutions of international society: the balance of power in 
international society, for instance, plays a highly ambiguous role in relation to international 
society’s goals such as limiting harm and protecting the independence of its members, given 
the way some states are sacrificed for the sake of the balance (Bull 2012, 88). 
 
Interdependence of the Institutions of Transnational Society and International Society 
As we have seen, transnational order is in part facilitated by states: their concentration of 
legitimate violence and procedures to proscribe criminal and violent behaviours among TNAs 
limit the scope for ‘uncivil’ activity among TNAs. In large part, this is achieved at the national 
level: transnational NGOs and corporations are registered and monitored as associations, 
charities or companies within the jurisdiction of the countries in which they operate, often 
with the headquarters registered in one country and local branches registered separately in 
each country in which they function. While TNAs lack legal recognition at the global level 
(Thrandardottir and Keating 2018), intergovernmental provisions such as the ECOSOC criteria 
for consultative status and the United Nations Global Compact provide standards of expected 
behaviour of participating TNAs (Willetts 2011). Therefore, as depicted at the centre of figure 
3, states in international society play a significant role in providing regulatory oversight of 
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TNAs, and thereby providing a facilitative context for the operation of the institutions of 
transnational society. 
 In the opposite direction, as also depicted at the centre of figure 3, TNAs can play an 
important role in advocating for reform in the institutions of international society. The 
advocacy role of transnational NGOs has been one of their most commonly observed 
features, and it is claimed that they have been important ‘norm entrepreneurs’ promoting 
reforms in institutions of international society as varied as the establishment of new 
organizations such as the International Criminal Court (Glasius 2006) and new laws such as 
the Convention on Cluster Munitions (Borrie 2009).  
 A third feature of the relationship between the institutions of international society 
and those of transnational society depicted at the centre of figure 3 is the mutual legitimation 
of their respective institutions. On the one hand, states have helped to legitimate TNAs’ 
standards by integrating them within national legislation: privately-developed IFRS 
international accounting standards, for instance, are required by law for publicly accountable 
entities in more than 100 countries (van Greuning, Scott, and Terblanche 2011, vii). On the 
other hand, TNAs play a significant role in legitimating intergovernmental institutions: Zaum 
(2011, 18), for instance, notes the role of the International Coalition for the Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P) in ‘legitimating the role of the UN as the guardian of R2P’. Moreover, since there 
are parallels between the institutions of international society and those of transnational 
society, the adoption of similar practices in each domain plays a part in their mutual 
legitimation.  
 The institutions of transnational society and those of international society are 
therefore interdependent. It is possible to disaggregate a spectrum of processes by which 
institutions of transnational society depend on states in international society, drawing from 
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the analysis in this article so far. First, states in international society may directly provide 
institutions of transnational society, such as the ECOSOC recognition criteria. Second, states 
in international society may provide funding or other material resources for institutions of 
transnational society: for example, secondary institutions of transnational society including 
GRI and Accountable Now have been supported by government donations. Third, 
governments legitimate institutions of transnational society through recognition: for 
instance, the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration included an article encouraging TNAs to adhere 
to GRI rules (Brown, de Jong, and Lessidrenska 2007, 5). Fourth, states may indirectly facilitate 
institutions of transnational society, such as through the provision of model standards which 
TNAs may emulate: standards of accountability in transnational society, for instance, may 
draw on states’ provisions for reporting by registered associations and corporations (Crack 
2018). Fifth, states may complement institutions of transnational society: transnational 
dispute resolution mechanisms such as those of the Committee for Arbitration in Sport, for 
instance, rely on national courts if their own procedures fail to bring about resolution 
(Chappelet 2008, 130), and transnational society’s recognition criteria are complemented by 
states’ registration procedures for associations and corporations at the national level. Sixth, 
states may advocate for new or changed institutions to be made by members of transnational 
society, just as transnational associations may advocate reforms in international society: 
Accountable Now, for instance, represents – at least in part – a response by TNAs to increased 
pressure from states for transnational associations to improve their accountability 
procedures (Crack 2018). Seventh, states may simply play a permissive role, for instance by 
providing an open institutional framework within which organized non-state activity may 
flourish, through, for instance, legal provisions guaranteeing freedom of association (Kaldor 
2012, 129-130). More generally, given the concentration of legitimate use of force in the 
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society of states, it may be argued that international society provides a stable context for the 
functioning of transnational society. Eighth, states may facilitate institutions of transnational 
society by serving as a target motivating the formation of transnational institutions, either to 
address needs not fulfilled in international society and provide private alternatives to services 
provided governmentally (in the case of service-oriented TNAs), or to promote change in 
international society (in the case of advocacy-oriented TNAs) (Beer, Bartley, and Roberts 
2012). 
 Conversely, institutions of international society depend in part on institutions of 
transnational society, especially through the advocacy and legitimation functions noted at the 
start of this section. With respect to international law, a significant component of its content 
was pioneered by transnational society actors serving as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ putting 
forward new standards that have helped international society to adapt to societal changes 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Glasius 2006). With respect to intergovernmental 
organizations, we have seen that actors in transnational society are thought to play an 
important part in their legitimation (Zaum 2013, 18). Even sovereignty is arguably legitimated 
by transnational society actors such as those promoting principles including national self-
determination and national taxation of transnational corporations that require a society of 
sovereign states for implementation (Hardt 2004, 233). As was noted earlier in the article, 
given the exclusion of terrorist TNAs from consideration as legitimate ‘civil’ actors in 
transnational society, the recognition criteria of transnational society implicitly recognize the 
concentration in the international society of states of legitimate use of violence. 
Transnational organizations may also facilitate hegemony in the society of states by acting as 
agents (directly or indirectly) of hegemonic powers, for instance in their participation in 
democratization and development initiatives (Wright 2012).  
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There are further aspects of the interrelationship between transnational society and 
international society that need to be taken into consideration. As Willetts (2011, 72-80) has 
argued, the boundary between transnational society actors and international society actors 
is blurred, since there are many hybrid organizations consisting of both governmental actors 
and TNAs which function across both international society and transnational society. These 
include human equality actors such as the International Labour Organization, comprised of 
representatives of states, employers and trade unions; and environmental stewardship 
institutions such as the International Union for Conservation of Nature, comprised of 
representatives of state agencies and INGOs. Organizations such as these are significant not 
only for facilitating functional co-operation in the particular issue-areas with which they are 
concerned, but also for forming bridges between international society and transnational 
society. Also blurring the boundary between international society and transnational society 
is the acceptance by TNAs of the state sovereignty framework implicit in their participation in 
provisions for registration within states as associations and corporations which complement 
the recognition criteria of transnational society noted earlier in the article. The boundary 
between international society and transnational society is further blurred by the participation 
of TNAs in joint projects with actors in international society, and their acceptance of funding 
from states. These practices encompass both non-profit TNAs such as humanitarian 
associations which accept funding from governments in support of development assistance 
projects (Banks, Hulme and Edwards 2015), and for-profit TNAs such as transnational 
corporations participating in government-funded post-war reconstruction initiatives (Davis 
2012). In the reverse direction, governing parties in states have accepted donations from 
TNAs which have influenced states’ allocation of contracts with TNAs in such activities (Long 
et al. 2007).  
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Acceptance of government funds by TNAs and their participation in joint projects with 
states are especially common practices in the institutions of international society that are 
considered to be shared, such as human equality and environmental stewardship. In the case 
of environmental stewardship, intergovernmental bodies have funded TNAs’ environmental 
initiatives including certification systems such as the Forest Stewardship Council (Pattberg 
2005), while TNAs have served roles in the projects of intergovernmental organizations such 
as the Global Environment Facility (Young 2007). TNAs have commonly been given a formal 
voice in policy deliberations in international environmental congresses since the 1992 Rio 
Earth Summit, and TNAs have been allocated responsibilities by states in international 
environmental conventions such as the Framework Convention on Climate Change (Betsill 
2015). Many environmental governance initiatives are joint intergovernmental-TNA 
initiatives such as the World Bank – WWF Alliance (Gulbrandsen 2010, 161). In this manner, 
transnational society and international society have become increasingly integrated (Buzan 
2018, 138). 
The shared institutions of transnational society and the analogous institutions of 
transnational society are closely linked to each other: for instance, many of the common 
standards among TNAs are provisions for environmental sustainability, which are a 
substantial component of the standards of GRI and Accountable Now, among others. In the 
reverse direction, standards such as those of GRI and Accountable Now help to make 
environmental stewardship possible by providing criteria by which this stewardship is 
intended to be achieved. More broadly, it should further be noted that many of the 
fundamental goals of transnational society such as legitimacy and serving constituents are 
facilitated by the shared institutions of international society and transnational society, and 
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not merely by the analogous institutions considered in this article: adherence to 
environmental standards, for example, forms part of the basis for TNA legitimacy. 
The institutions of international society and of transnational society have evolved 
alongside one another and influence each other. The membership criteria of each of 
international society and transnational society are in certain respects co-constitutive,  each 
excluding the membership of the other from their own membership and thereby helping to 
delineate each other’s boundaries. Further features of the parallel institutions of 
international society and transnational society have developed together: with respect to 
means of authoritative communication, for instance, the adoption of common pre-eminent 
languages of mutual discourse such and English and French has taken place in parallel among 
states and TNAs (Crystal 2003). In other cases, states and TNAs have collaborated in the 
development of each other’s institutions: through advocacy at intergovernmental 
congresses, for instance, NGOs have helped to transform international law among states 
(Clark 2007), while states have helped to shape the accountability criteria among TNAs 
through participation in for instance the meetings of the designers of these standards 
(Deloffre 2016). The standards of one may also be emulated or adopted by the other, with 
actors in transnational society drawing on the registration criteria of states for associations 
and corporations in their accountability standards, and states adopting TNAs’ accounting 
standards in their legislation. Each of the parallel institutions of international society and 
transnational society have also responded in similar ways to wider contextual changes: 
especially notable in the context of economic globalization in recent years has been their 
greater openness to profit-making actors, either as members in the case of transnational 
society, or as collaborators in the case of the shared institutions of international society. 
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Conclusion: Reinterpreting World Order 
Whereas traditional interpretations of world order have emphasized the development of 
common institutions among states in pursuit of the common goals of international society, 
such a perspective is inadequate for understanding the globalized and multi-actor nature of 
contemporary world politics. This problem should not be addressed by abandoning the notion 
of institutions in contemporary world politics, but instead – as has been pursued in this article 
– by understanding the institutions among TNAs as well as states, and the interactions 
between state and non-state institutions. In this perspective, world order consists of both 
states and the institutions they have built in pursuit of the common goals of international 
society, and TNAs and the institutions that have been developed in pursuit of the common 
goals of transnational society, in addition to the institutions shared by international society 
and transnational society. 
Given that states are territorial and multi-functional actors whereas TNAs are 
deterritorialized and multi-functional, it is significant that the institutions of transnational 
society outlined in this article mirror in multiple respects major institutions of international 
society. This mirroring relates both to the nature of the institutions – such as mutual 
recognition criteria and dispute resolution procedures – and the purposes of these 
institutions, such as serving constitutive as well as regulative functions and helping to 
promote wider goals such as self-preservation and limitation of violence. 
As was noted in the introduction to this article, a core concern in the contemporary 
era is the perceived threat that the rising significance of TNAs purportedly poses to traditional 
state-centric institutions of world order. By exploring how in transnational society TNAs have 
developed institutions that mirror significant institutions of international society, this article 
has helped to reveal how, by contrast, TNAs have developed institutions to promote order 
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within transnational society, just as states have developed institutions to promote order in 
international society. The potential challenge to world order posed by the rise of NSAs is 
therefore at least in part being managed by TNAs themselves through their common 
institutions. 
Moreover, the challenge of the rise of TNAs is also being managed through the 
interactions that have developed between the institutions of transnational society and those 
of international society. As we have seen, transnational society’s institutions and 
international society’s institutions mutually legitimate one another, and through advocacy in 
both directions may facilitate improvements in these institutions better to address the 
problems confronting humanity. Given the functional similarities between the institutions of 
international society and the institutions of transnational society outlined in this article, which 
includes addressing a shared interest in containment of terrorist TNAs, this article has 
indicated how the ascent of TNAs, far from destabilizing world order, may instead offer 
mechanisms by which a more peaceful world order may be envisaged. Also in light of the 
similarities between the institutions of international society and transnational society 
outlined in this article, these similarities may offer prospects for their smooth interaction in 
addressing common goals. Transnational society and its institutions may not be as 
comprehensive, advanced or universal as international society and its institutions, but the 
institutions of transnational society have provided a model of legitimate behaviour that has 
been increasingly adopted by a growing array of TNAs, while over the last few centuries the 
international society of states has acquired near-universality from previously geographically 
limited scope.  
The study of the institutions of transnational society, their interactions with 
institutions of international society, and the repercussions for world order which this article 
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has opened up offers a fruitful area for further research. Greater research is needed into the 
particular contributions of profit-making in contrast to non-profit-making actors in respect of 
these institutions, an area which English School research remains insufficiently oriented 
towards. Although there has been attention to the role of the market as a shared institution 
of international society and transnational society (Buzan 2018), there is scope for further 
research into the mirroring of market-based practices among states and TNAs, such as the 
emulation of private actors’ governance features in states’ ‘new public management’ and its 
repercussions for the institutions of international society. Related to this is the 
‘commodification of security’ given the increased role of private military and security 
companies, which challenges the traditional boundaries between international society and 
transnational society with respect to legitimate use of violence, and raises questions 
concerning the autonomy of actors in international society and transnational society that rely 
on the services of these companies (Krahmann 2008). 
There is also scope for further research into the ethical implications and legitimacy of 
transnational society and its institutions, and especially the ethical implications of the 
increasing prominence of profit-making actors in these institutions. Additionally productive 
for further research would be greater interrogation into the role of the less formally organized 
aspects of transnational society, and the various non-institutionalized dimensions of what 
Buzan (2004) refers to as the ‘interhuman’ domain. Processes of change among the 
institutions of transnational society also merit further investigation, as do the co-evolution of 
institutions of international society and transnational society.  
We have seen in this article that insights drawing from English School theory can help 
us understand a globalized multi-actor world. Society beyond the state is multidimensional 
 42 
and we need to think more about how state and non-state dimensions operate beyond 
procedures of global governance on which so much existing work has often concentrated. 
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Figure 1. The Traditional Model of World Order.  
Sources: Bull (2012) on international society, and Wapner (1995) on transnational society. 
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Figure 2. Transnational Society as a Mirror of International Society. 
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Figure 3. A Reinterpretation of Contemporary World Order. 
